Ray Kurzweil, Cyberprophet or Crack-Pot?

[TallDave]

John,

Read the paragraph I just added.

The argument that we can't allow explanations that flow from the existence of complex interactions amounts to assiging complexity the status of mysticism. Then we might as well throw out systems like the stock market that have emergent properties and use astrology to set stock prices instead.

Emergent properties are not unexplained properties.

[JohnSmith]

I more took issue with your 'allow' statement than your position. Like I said, it's a terrible argument.

I take no position on the emergent property/mystical watcher debate. I find both arguments rather flat, and can't think of any alternatives. I take the wait and see approach.

[JoeStrout]

I wouldn't kill myself before I slept, because I'm me. I'd try and kill the aliens!

OK, but that's cheating. Suppose you can't; their technology is far beyond us (as it must be, if they're able to take you apart bit by bit and build another just like you). If you don't care about the guy who wore your shoes yesterday, you shouldn't care about the new guy who'll be wearing them tomorrow either — you should despair, consider your life at its end, and engage in whatever risky behaviors you would do if the doctor told you you had a deadly (but currently symptomless) virus that would kill you in 24 hours.

But I propose that you wouldn't do this. Despite your arguments, you'd recognize that if this has been going on for months and you never even noticed, then it really doesn't matter all that much. You'd end up going to bed pretty much as you always have, despite your philosophical discomfort, and after a couple more months of this, you'd hardly even think of it any more.

(And you would be quite correct at that point — because the new duplicate created every night really and truly is you, just as much as the morning-you is the same person as the evening-you after ordinary sleep.)

Note that there are other variations on this experiment. Perhaps the entire universe disappears from existence and reappears every N femtoseconds, and this whole illusion of continuity we have is just a sham. The nightly alien experiment is exactly the same thing, just on a different scale. Also, by tinkering with the details of how the aliens take you apart and build a new you (details we haven't yet specified), we can debunk the "gradual replacement" crutch as well.

And maybe philosophy is supposed to be lots of thought experiments, but I always see arguments about 'logic' and 'obviously true.'

Well, you do have to approach the thought experiments logically, or they don't do any good.

Best,
- Joe

[JoeStrout]

My problem is simply that after you're dead, the pause in your mind never resumes.

Agreed.

This is a circular argument. We have a mind at time T1. At time T2, we have no mind (which could be something as innocuous as brain activity being halted by deep hypothermic surgery, or it could be something else). We have a mind at time T3.

Now, to say that "the pause in your mind never resumes" would be true only if the mind we're considering at T3 is not the same mind as that at T1. Or in more standard terms, if the person at T1 and the person at T3 are not the same person.

So, you've simply asserted your own argument: after you're dead, the person you are isn't there any more. I would agree with that. But that implies that if the person you are IS there, then you are not dead.

In fact, you've come (in a somewhat roundabout way) to the very reason that personal duplication (whether by mind uploading, Star Trek transporter, nightly aliens, or whatever) constitutes survival. If there is a person in the future who is me, then I have not died (even if some particular instances of me were destroyed).

Best,
- Joe

[JoeStrout]

I don't see it either. The only copies of me I'd consider being me would be those thru whose eyes I could see at the same time as mine. Anything else is just a replica.

This theory of personal identity is preposterous — it says, by very definition, that you can't have the same person at two different points in time. So you are not the same person you were a second ago, because you can't see through the eyes of the second-ago-you and the now-you at the same time.

Please try again — come up with a theory that explains how you are you, even over time, yet you are not the same person as me or John McCain or your twin brother. Given person P1 at time T1, and person P2 at time T2, how do you define whether P1 and P2 are the same person?

If you want a shortcut, I've been considering this question for many years, and the only sensible answer I've found is: P1 and P2 are the same person to the extent that they share the same mental structure. But by all means, come up with a new one if you can.

Best,
- Joe

[JoeStrout]

You seem to be OK with painless obliteration as long as your pattern is reproduced elsewhere. Question: Would you require that your replica be instantiated the instant that you die? What if your pattern was stored, and a replica was recreated some time later? How about a thousand years from now? A billion?

I don't require any particular speediness of the instantiation; indeed, if I end up needing my cryonics arrangements, I fully expect to be out of it for years or decades. Yet, if all goes well, I will have survived.

If the new me were activated a thousand years or a billion years from now, I would have survived just as well. Of course it would be distressing if everyone I know is dead, or if society has changed so much I find it hard to adapt, etc. But the exact same would apply if, say, you put me in a SF-style "stasis field" that simply slowed or stopped time for a while. And I think we would all agree that such a field raises no personal identity or survival issues, right?

What if your replica was made before you were killed? Would you have second thoughts?

No, in fact it'd be comforting to be able to see with my own eyes that the duplication was successful before this biological body gives out. Of course, in reality, it won't happen that way — you can't scan a brain with sufficient resolution to upload it from outside the skull. So uploading will probably require vitrification and serial sectioning (i.e., taking the brain apart slice by slice).

But for the sake of the thought experiment, sure, it doesn't matter whether the duplicate is activated before or after the original is destroyed.

What does matter is how much time the original experiences after the backup copy is made, and before it is activated. Just like a month-old backup of your hard drive is less satisfactory than an hour-old one when you have a hard drive crash, an old personal backup is less satisfactory too, because the person then activated is somewhat less the same person by that point.

That will become a real issue in a post-uploading world... so remember to get yourself on a regular backup schedule!

Best,
- Joe

[JoeStrout]

It's true you are very similar from moment to moment, but when you start to think about copies it highlights the fact you may have diametrically opposed interests just from the fact you now occupy different physical avatars.

Consider the Prestige situation -- one copy of you is about to die, so now suddenly the tiny difference between you and your copy becomes a life or death detail.

No, that's not a life or death detail, because you and your copy are the same person, and you (as a person) are going to live as long as either copy does. You're speaking from your intuition based on living in a world where there are no personal duplicates.

Now, it's certainly fair to say the two copies are in different situations, and may have very different interests (if for example one of them were going to suffer). But that doesn't matter to identity. Your situation could suddenly change greatly — say, for example, you get hit by a bus and are now concerned with keeping your legs — but you would still be (mostly) the same person, right?

[JohnSmith]

Now, to say that "the pause in your mind never resumes" would be true only if the mind we're considering at T3 is not the same mind as that at T1. Or in more standard terms, if the person at T1 and the person at T3 are not the same person.

So, you've simply asserted your own argument: after you're dead, the person you are isn't there any more. I would agree with that. But that implies that if the person you are IS there, then you are not dead.

This goes back to the 'given value of "me"' argument. After the moment of split, there is 'me' and 'him.' So I will not be there. I will be 'ceased.'

Here's a (probably not so) novel thought. Instead of defining a person by what there brain structure is/has been, let's try by what it will be.

It makes my position easier to argue...

[JohnSmith]

Joe, you keep coming back to the thought that, "My Identity goes forward."
To me, that seems to miss the point. I don't care if my identity goes forward, I want to go forward. There's a definite difference.

Though you might win in the end. I started reading a book a while ago that dealt with mind uploading, and the gaps/identity stuff resulting from accidental death. Part of the premise was simply that the uploaded people outlived everyone who objected.
Actually, I think that was already mentioned.

[JoeStrout]

So, you've simply asserted your own argument: after you're dead, the person you are isn't there any more. I would agree with that. But that implies that if the person you are IS there, then you are not dead.

This goes back to the 'given value of "me"' argument. After the moment of split, there is 'me' and 'him.' So I will not be there. I will be 'ceased.'

By assertion? Seriously, on what do you base this conclusion? I say that after the moment of split, there is "you #1" and "you #2". So you will continue to be there (and not cease to exist) as long as either one persists. I have explained how I come to this conclusion, and backed it up with examples. Please provide a counter-argument if you can, without just asserting your conclusion again.

This is only difficult because we're used to identifying persons by their bodies, because we lack the means to copy the complex pattern of mental structures that really (in my opinion) defines a person. But we do have experience, these days, with copying other complex structures. Say you've been working on your novel for the last three years. I sneak into your house, make a copy of the file, and then delete the original. Is your novel gone? Have I destroyed your work? For a moment there was clearly "your novel" and "copy of your novel" — just like the two copies of you above, and then I destroyed one. Does it matter?

Then, you bump the delete key and permanently erase the second copy. Are you upset now? What's the difference? Why did one deletion not matter, but the other did?

Now, try the same logic on for size with persons, and try to let go of your intuition that persons are bodies. (That's an intuition that would apply to books if they were written by hand on parchment and couldn't be copied... but that's not the case, and won't always be the case with people either.)

Here's a (probably not so) novel thought. Instead of defining a person by what there brain structure is/has been, let's try by what it will be.

It makes my position easier to argue...

Sure, you can do it either way. At some point in the future, will I be alive? Will there be any person there who is me? Is there anyone there whose experiences I am correct to anticipate as my own, and who would be correct to reminisce about the experiences I'm having now as his own?

Easy: there is, if any person at that time has the same mental structure as me. That means, among other things, that he would remember being me having this conversation. (This again is Locke's idea, though it has some holes if you try to stick to Boolean logic with it.)

This theory of identity is simple, noncircular, correctly resolves all common-day experiences, as well as plausible what-ifs like the nightly aliens. And it handles unusual (in our current experience) situations like personal duplication perfectly well.

Best,
- Joe

[JohnSmith]

Well, since you accept my idea of identifying a person by what their brain structure will be, let me run with that.

We all agree that the more time since a copy event, the less same the two will be. Which leads to the conclusion that their brains will be different. Which leads directly to the thought that they are different people. Tada!
Told you it made my argument easier.

You're asserting that there's me#1 and me#2, and that they are equivalent. I disagree.
Let's take your computer example. So you copy my novel, and now there's two. Ok.
First point, people are not novels; I am of the 'people are intrinsically important' persuasion, so deleting one, even an identical one, is a no-no. Think newborn identical twins.

Point two, and more logical I suppose. Take my method of identifying a person; what's the future of the two novels? Do you take one home and edit it? In which case it's not my novel. Do I revise mine? It's not the same novel as it was before. So neither should be destroyed, even if they're identical now.

Look, for the 'instantanious create/destroy' thing, I don't know. Grey area.
I'm concerned with creating a computer double, then croaking. That, by my examples, is not continuing 'me.'

[JoeStrout]

We all agree that the more time since a copy event, the less same the two will be. Which leads to the conclusion that their brains will be different. Which leads directly to the thought that they are different people. Tada!

Yes — in exactly the same way that one person becomes gradually less the same person over time. I'm not exactly the same person I was a moment ago; even less the person I was a year ago; and much less the person I was when I was three years old. To some extent, I'm still the same person, but not entirely.

Two copies become more and more different people from each other, at exactly the same rate that one person becomes a different person over time.

This is not a problem.

Let's take your computer example. So you copy my novel, and now there's two. Ok.
First point, people are not novels; I am of the 'people are intrinsically important' persuasion, so deleting one, even an identical one, is a no-no. Think newborn identical twins.

Newborn identical twins are not the same person. We have no experience with two copies of the same person (but someday we will).

And of course people are more important than novels — I would expect you to be more upset when a person you love dies than when a novel you've worked on for years is lost. But that's not relevant to the argument as far as I can see.

Point two, and more logical I suppose. Take my method of identifying a person; what's the future of the two novels? Do you take one home and edit it? In which case it's not my novel.

Really? If I just correct a minor typo, it's no longer your novel? If I have a copy of "Huckleberry Finn" but somebody has smudged out a few letters on page 72, is it no longer "Huckleberry Finn"?

(And a side question: I have, in fact, read Huckleberry Finn. Have you read the same book, perchance?)

Do I revise mine? It's not the same novel as it was before. So neither should be destroyed, even if they're identical now.

You've painted yourself into a corner and are now claiming absurdities. In real life, you would NOT care if one of two identical copies of your novel is destroyed. This is the whole purpose of backup copies — you keep them around in case the original is lost, and then you restore from them, and you're happy to have lost nothing. (Unless, of course, you made some changes since the last backup; your dissatisfaction relates to how many such changes were compared to the total pattern.)

Look, for the 'instantanious create/destroy' thing, I don't know. Grey area.
I'm concerned with creating a computer double, then croaking. That, by my examples, is not continuing 'me.'

If you'll pardon me for saying it, your examples don't hold water.

Best,
- Joe

[JohnSmith]

But you're confusing my view with yours again.

What it will be. Not what it is now.
Yes, a person becomes different over time. But if you are copied, what you will be and what he will be are different. So you're different people.
So this is a problem for your view.

By your view, the twins are the same person, but maybe nine months apart. They started as one cell, after all. But not relevant, like you said.

The book analogies are just that: analogies. They don't work perfectly. But I don't see why you think my logic doesn't hold.

[rj40]

This conversation has left me in the dust. I don’t take illegal drugs, but has anyone here been smoking marijuana while reading or participating in this thread? Care to elaborate? Any pot induced insights? I’m lost.



But having fun!

What about amnesia? Does that concept illuminate anything? Say someone looses her memory for a while. The personality doesn’t change, just the lack of conscious memory of past experience. Is she still the same person she used to be? From her point of view she might still have a feeling of continuity from some unknown past; maybe feelings, ideas and skills that she has no explanation for, but are present nonetheless. Then her memory gradually comes back, does she gradually become the same person again? Wasn’t she always the same person, only lacking long-term memories? If someone offered you the choice of death or permanent amnesia of everything that happened before the “procedure” what would you choose? Both seem sucky to me.

[JoeStrout]

Yes, a person becomes different over time. But if you are copied, what you will be and what he will be are different. So you're different people.
So this is a problem for your view.

No, it is not a problem, any more than becoming a different person over time is a problem. It's the exact same thing. Am I the same person I was a year ago? Mostly so. Am I the same person as my duplicate who was made a year ago? Mostly so.

By your view, the twins are the same person, but maybe nine months apart. They started as one cell, after all. But not relevant, like you said.

Not relevant because there is no mental structure in one cell. I'm not going to get into an argument about when a fetus becomes a person, except to say that it is not at the single-cell stage, and so for the entire history of the twins as people, they have been separate. They share genetics and a womb, but those are fairly minor factors — most of the detailed wiring of the brain at birth is random, just like fingerprints.

The book analogies are just that: analogies. They don't work perfectly. But I don't see why you think my logic doesn't hold.

What is your logic? I've gone back and reviewed your recent posts in this thread, and I still don't see it. You have asserted a couple times that duplicates diverging over time is a problem, but haven't given any reason why that would be. You tried to dodge the alien-replacement question, and when I pointed that out, just ignored it. You made a circular argument about how you're dead when you're dead, and when I pointed that out, you can (as far as I can tell) ignored that too, and made another assertion that copies are not you.

So if you do have a coherent theory of personal identity, please spell it out for me. We have two person references, P1 and P2, which may or may not refer to the same person. How do you define whether they do? I've spelled out the theory I find credible, but I'd love to hear yours.

Best,
- Joe