So you are arguing that achieving the maximum blast area is generally not desirable when targeting a city? Or what?ladajo wrote: Please see section 15 in Appendix F for an explanation of the Targeting Process.
Please note the part of Force Application.
This entire document is a clue that your statement "in general" is not true.
There is no "in general" when doing Target Planning for nuclear employment.
I said earlier that you will want to change that if you attack a hardened target. Either way, you have not brought any sources to contradict me, other than "you are stupid, I know better", which sorry does not fly in a discussion.
I don't know what exactly the issue is here. Are we talking about hardened targets, like bunkers and military installations? No, we are not. We are talking about a terrorist attack against a city. That would have two desired outcomes:ladajo wrote: You should be smart enough at this point to realize the maximised effect is determined by the effect sought, and that then drives the planning considerations for Weaponeering and Force Application. Given that you don't have access to true nuclear weaponeering and application guidance, I will grant that your little adventure will have to end here.
Again, there is no "in general". It is okay to admit you are wrong now.
Your are out of your depth, but at least I got you to learn about a new concept for you called, "The Targeting Process".
1. Maximum destruction.
2. Maximum fallout.
I did talk a bit about both. I even mentioned how a cloud of radioactive seawater would be really bad and could be a desirable outcome for a terrorist.
But if someone uses a plane, the best effect would be a maximized blast radius and that means an explosion above ground and not on the ground. It just makes no sense otherwise.
Yeah, I am sure the contributors to the study all knew nothing of what they were talking about. I did actually look at that (quite impressive) list. Did you?ladajo wrote: You should actually read the '79 study vice posting a link. One of the '79 study's biggest shortcomings is the assumption of scope of conflict. It has been built upon since. One thing in particular that has been significantly developed is the definitions and understandings of ranges of conflict both from Escalation Management and Descalation perspectives. There are other pubs that provide a wider range detailed study of types and dimensions of nuclear exchanges. Unfortunately, a number of them are not available to you, nor probably will they ever be.
Also note that congress sure took it seriously.
I will admit thought that a few items have indeed changed since the late 70ies: Russian guidance systems got more precise, so they have more warheads and lower yields on those that are targeting hardened installations like missile silos. That will reduce the amount of severe fallout a bit, which will reduce the amount of people dying in the aftermath.
I do not quite understand what else you were vaguely hinting at. You think that once the nukes start going off, the Russians will exercise restraint? And once the nukes go off over bases in US cities, the US will use restraint on where to use the nukes? I don't think so.