Socialism As Socialism Does

[MSimon]

And this:

http://powerandcontrol.blogspot.com/201 ... esson.html

[choff]

If I shared a large border with Nazi Germany I would insist on 200,000 tanks, not 20,000. My foreign policy would absolutely be for a preemptive attack. Hilter's policy towards Slavic people was that after he conquered them, a handful would be kept around for scientific experiments. Another handful would be kept around for hazardous jobs, like mines, the rest would be killed off. Communists and Nazis were not on good terms by wars end, regardless of political leanings.

I've seen old war documentaries where they've interviewed French leaders from 39/40. They had several options for defence, but always seemed to pick the worst, and these were educated guys, top of the class. I always got the impression they were talking dumber than they were.

Skipjack, did it ever seem to any Germans that the victory over France in 1940 was a little too easy! All skill aside, your tanks weren't that great. Ever think maybe the fix was in.

[Diogenes]

I wish everyone would get off this recrimination by proxy business.

[IntLibber]

If I shared a large border with Nazi Germany I would insist on 200,000 tanks, not 20,000. My foreign policy would absolutely be for a preemptive attack. Hilter's policy towards Slavic people was that after he conquered them, a handful would be kept around for scientific experiments. Another handful would be kept around for hazardous jobs, like mines, the rest would be killed off. Communists and Nazis were not on good terms by wars end, regardless of political leanings.

I've seen old war documentaries where they've interviewed French leaders from 39/40. They had several options for defence, but always seemed to pick the worst, and these were educated guys, top of the class. I always got the impression they were talking dumber than they were.

Skipjack, did it ever seem to any Germans that the victory over France in 1940 was a little too easy! All skill aside, your tanks weren't that great. Ever think maybe the fix was in.

French defensive incompetence, aside from the inferiority of equipment that I have previously detailed at length, was widespread. Intellect is not a prerequisite for martial competence, and the French operated under a conscription system that was akin to jury duty here in the US: generally the dumbest and least connected wound up in service, other than a few stellar examples who rose to the top but still couldn't overcome the inertia of idiocy in their civillian government.

[choff]

I find it extremely difficult to accept the idea that the French are total idiots.
One explanation I saw was that French moral was bad on account of the rain.

[MSimon]

I find it extremely difficult to accept the idea that the French are total idiots.
One explanation I saw was that French moral was bad on account of the rain.

There was significant support for the Nazi program in France. Was the defeat due to incompetence or treachery?

The German Generals had a timetable similar to the French. If the war had been run according to the "reasonable" schedule France had a chance of countering the German blow.

Instead the German tank Generals sped up the tempo. The French were lost.

[Luzr]

Skipjack, did it ever seem to any Germans that the victory over France in 1940 was a little too easy! All skill aside, your tanks weren't that great. Ever think maybe the fix was in.

I think we simply have to accept that German military doctrine, planning, execution and performance were simply brilliant at that time.

Frankly, with Blitzkrieg, it does not really matter if your tanks are not that great. The decisive factor is speed.

Besides, AFAIK, French tanks were not "that great" either. In fact, French defensive strategy was based on fortresses. Which was the ultimate mistake - Germans simple ignored them....

[MSimon]

In fact, French defensive strategy was based on fortresses

A common misconception. The purpose of the French Fortresses was to channel the attack. They did that. What the French did not do was stick to the strategy the fortresses were built for. - await the Germans in France.

[Luzr]

In fact, French defensive strategy was based on fortresses

A common misconception. The purpose of the French Fortresses was to channel the attack. They did that. What the French did not do was stick to the strategy the fortresses were built for. - await the Germans in France.

Are you sure about that? I am scratching my head, but I do not believe that any intelligent military planner would build fortress only to make enemy to attack from unpredictable direction.

My understanding is that Maginot linie was built based on WWI experiences. Which were irrelevant in modern highly mobile war.

[IntLibber]

In fact, French defensive strategy was based on fortresses

A common misconception. The purpose of the French Fortresses was to channel the attack. They did that. What the French did not do was stick to the strategy the fortresses were built for. - await the Germans in France.

Are you sure about that? I am scratching my head, but I do not believe that any intelligent military planner would build fortress only to make enemy to attack from unpredictable direction.

My understanding is that Maginot linie was built based on WWI experiences. Which were irrelevant in modern highly mobile war.

It wasn't unpredicted. The point was to use the Belgians as an early warning system, and give the french time to bomb belgian bridges. Unfortunately, french fighter aircraft were abysmal, France had absolutely zero tactical ground attack aircraft comparable to the Stuka, and their bombers were incapable of precision bombing of bridges, or even of daytime raids due to minimal armament and poor fighter escort capacity.

French fighter aircraft were like British automobiles: hand made, and crappy electrical systems. At the start of the war most were missing guns and gunsights due to supply problems.

The French couldn't retreat faster than the Germans could advance, so they suffered from serious attrition/capture losses. Stukas were even able to bomb French bridges behind French lines to eliminate their ability to retreat, forcing their surrender.

Meanwhile all the capability invested in the maginot line was frozen in place, unable to be redeployed.

[Jccarlton]

A common misconception. The purpose of the French Fortresses was to channel the attack. They did that. What the French did not do was stick to the strategy the fortresses were built for. - await the Germans in France.

Are you sure about that? I am scratching my head, but I do not believe that any intelligent military planner would build fortress only to make enemy to attack from unpredictable direction.

My understanding is that Maginot linie was built based on WWI experiences. Which were irrelevant in modern highly mobile war.

It wasn't unpredicted. The point was to use the Belgians as an early warning system, and give the french time to bomb belgian bridges. Unfortunately, french fighter aircraft were abysmal, France had absolutely zero tactical ground attack aircraft comparable to the Stuka, and their bombers were incapable of precision bombing of bridges, or even of daytime raids due to minimal armament and poor fighter escort capacity.

French fighter aircraft were like British automobiles: hand made, and crappy electrical systems. At the start of the war most were missing guns and gunsights due to supply problems.

The French couldn't retreat faster than the Germans could advance, so they suffered from serious attrition/capture losses. Stukas were even able to bomb French bridges behind French lines to eliminate their ability to retreat, forcing their surrender.

Meanwhile all the capability invested in the maginot line was frozen in place, unable to be redeployed.

I think that what it comes down to is that the French paid much to much attention to avoiding another war and no attention to how it might be fought, even when it was staring then in the face.

[MSimon]

The plan based on the purpose of the Maginot line was not a bad one.

Unfortunately politics forced a change of plan. i.e. there was not even a semblance of Allied unity until the wolf was at the door.

[IntLibber]

The plan based on the purpose of the Maginot line was not a bad one.

Unfortunately politics forced a change of plan. i.e. there was not even a semblance of Allied unity until the wolf was at the door.

It's pretty clear that the US played the war to maximize its position and hurt rivals. The war eliminated France as a global power in any sense but in their own minds, the damage suffered by the soviets helped ensure they wouldn't be capable of overrunning europe for a good amount of time, and the debts the UK rang up in Lend/Lease ensured they'd be a compliant junior partner in the anglosphere for many decades.

Any intelligent observer knew at the outset that if/when the US got in the war, it would win the war, it was just a matter of time and timing. Yamomoto knew this, hence why he designed his strike on Pearl Harbor to wipe out US pacific forces. Even then he knew that at best that only gave Japan 6 months to consolidate their position and build up their forces. He was educated in the US. When his superiors asked about the feasibility of a land invasion of the US, he responded it was futile, that "there's a rifle behind every blade of grass".

Back to France, though. The country has been multipersonality for decades between the right and left. On one side you had the proud imperialists that kept Indochina long after it was feasible, who brutally suppressed Algerian nationalists and insisted on continuing to colonize north africa, and refused to join NATO unless it had equal standing with the US. On the other side you have the radical leftists who would bring the country to a standstill over a minor labor issue and couldn't give a rats petard over national defense.

Many hoped occupation would cure it of its schitzophrenia, but the communists in the resistance used the Gestapo as their personal purging service to remove non-communists from resistance leadership.