ladajo wrote:They do not put accurate information in the public domain, if they did, there would be no point to it all being classified.
For all sorts of reasons, plenty of officially classified info is also public domain - the one does not cancel the other.
How all this relates to your original post, is that my point is there is no way that you would ever know when Israel, or for that matter, any nuclear armed state is going to use nuclear weapons, or how.
That is the same for *any* weapon. And even if you possess that weapon yourself you can not be certain what your enemy's "triggers" will be for using theirs.
For example, folks still argue and debate why the US used the two weapons in Japan, and also what those weapons actually accomplished (or not). However, that is the public debate. Inside the nuclear circle of the US government and nuclear military, folks do know what the trigger for use was, why we hit the targets we did, as well as, why we used two (not just one, not more), and, amazingly, they also have a really good idea what the weapons did and did not do.
Yes, there is still a great deal of debate about the strategic decisions made by all sides during WWII. But this mechanistic process of constraints, restraints and triggers that you suggest is not the whole story - in 1945 the decision to use atomic weapons had an obviously political dimension. The final decision was that of the chief executive, not the Generals'.
The documentation for a good bit of that stuff remains classified, even after 60+ years. What has been released, does not tell the whole story.
There is a huge amount of published data about the effects of the bombs, much of it from the Japanese themselves. And even were all of your classified information released it would still not tell "the whole story", it would just tell a different story.
You are (again no offense intended) very niave if you think you understand contemporary US Nuclear Strategy, the arsenal at hand or the histories and policies that they are based on.
So where did I claim to "understand contemporary US Nuclear Strategy"... strawman.
You certainly do not know what the arsenal can and can not do, and you also certainly do not know what the triggers for use are.
So let's go back and look at the post of mine that you were responding to. In answer to a previous post, in which it was suggested that Egypt might join Iran in a war against Israel, I said:
"
An attack from either country [Iran or Egypt] that threatened Israel's existence would go nuclear - see The Samson Option."
Note the phrase "
that threatened Israel's existence". I think it a more than reasonable deduction that an attack
that threatened Israel's existence (ie the highly unlikely circumstance that Israel was on the verge of being overrun by its enemies) would trigger Israel's use of its nuclear weapons. Do you disagree?
You may think you have a "fair idea", but I assure you, you do not. "Fair idea". Hah!
I assure you that that rather depends upon what I meant by a "fair idea" (= reasonable idea, a good approximation, not perfect access to the absolute truth) "Hah!" indeed.
BTW, I guess Israel, not having conducted battlefied testing (with the possible exception of a high altitude test over the Indian Ocean in 1979) has about as much knowledge as I do of the effects of nuclear weapons in use - so for the Israelis they are as much "mythical realm objects" as they are for Iran?